Generally, the majority of states are looking
for any "moral" form that justifies their rude opportunism or utility
and even aggression and destruction of others. So that approach can be
maximized to limitless levels, as the United States did exemplary by
formulating interests under Religious justifications 'Crusades of Bush Jr.' or
'a humane democratic morality for Obama.' That before Trump almost gave up on
and satisfied with the worthless slogan 'the war on terror.'
In this way, Trump approached a state that
had lost its identity 'non-Identity State', which is often a state in a stage
of transition in the international arena, where its external identity has not
yet been crystallized and sometimes even internal. Maybe also it is in a stage
of transformation, by abandoning its previous policies and ideologies, either
in looking for a new framework, or total denial of that. Besides, in other
folds, it is too small to have a clear identity.
Of course, many states have no identity,
whether it is a national, religious, or otherwise identity of the state in and
of itself. On the other hand, an international political identity. There are
clear models in the Arab world, in which many of its states have lost their
identities, or they have not acquired one: the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, for a
basic example.
These models are often more reconciled with
the "immoral" foreign policies and perhaps even know that their
opportunism is clear to everyone. Besides, they often try to promote their
unethical political model by the easiest way to reach their interests without
any trouble.
These states are difficult to predict
-apparently- their policy approach, but it is reality simpler than other
approaches. That approach is based on a permanent shift towards the most
important interest, even if it is temporary, where the transformation will take
place repeatedly.
Despite the temporary gains that these states
possess, they lose many permanent benefits, on top of which is building a
regional social incubator in which they are seen as the supreme model and
establish long-term "social" legitimacy for their interests.
Not to mention that it is a policy-related
primarily to the characters who made it, and it does not give any consideration
to social forces in the second state. On the contrary, it seeks to preserve its
interests by preserving the structures of other states and the continuity of
authoritarian structures as they are and undermining any social activities that
may harm their interests. Unless the authorities in those states did not offer
them the interests they covet, then they will work to overthrow them or even to
destroy the intended state, entirely, if it can do so.
Besides, these states with policies bare from
moral justifications are subject to constant suspicion of them by other actors,
whether due to the lack of a fixed pattern in their policies or to the
flexibility, opportunism, and change of their positions. Moreover, the other
actors, or some of them, will see in such a state as an entity that can be
compromised, not a state that has its status and its irreconcilable red lines.
While some European states try to preserve
some of their left "ethics" especially in the Syrian matter, this
modest "morality" here is not to justify interests, as it is a result
of the loss of effectiveness of work in the Syrian problem, and thus its
"morality" is hypocritical. And another face of rude Arab
opportunism.
We can apply the above to the Emirati rush to
announce the 'Normalization' of relations -that have existed for many years
with Israel-, and on several levels: political, military, security,
technological, intelligence, and economic level. Whereas the UAE, like the
smallest states in the Arab Gulf, is always operating by building a volatile
and dependent foreign policy on several external powers; To balance the small
size of the state and its lack of political weight, vis-à-vis the powerful
neighbors (what we might call: 'Saudi phobia' the UAE and Qatar's constant
concern about Saudi Arabia, despite the apparent rapprochement between the UAE
and Saudi Arabia).
Rather, this Emirati rush comes -in a context
beyond that-, which is a rude interest, through a clear representation of the
loss of the Arab and Islamic identity of its foreign policy. It hopes that its
drive towards Israel will be an enabler for the reproduction of the Middle
East, the disintegration and fragmentation of what remains in it from the
active forces and production of small and micro-entities that can be dominated.
In the same context comes their quest, which is still ongoing to separate
eastern Syria and build a state in it in favor of the militia of the SDF. Apart
from occupying its Gulf region militarily, and pushing Egypt towards permanent
preoccupation. Besides, a prominent Emirati presence on several militaries or
security-intelligence fronts and in search of the formulation of a fragmented
and without identity.
ABD ALQADER NANAA
PH.D. of Political Science