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Interview with Dr. ABD ALQADER NANAA
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been working against international agreements that took four centuries to take root in the international geopolitical field, which has made it a 'rouge state' according to Dr. ABD ALQADER NANAA, a specialist in Iranian and international affairs and the Chief Consultant of The Consulting Office for MENA. He points out that the Iranian project is based on historical, sectarian, and ethnonational claims that aims to build a new "Persian Empirical Era."
Interviewer: Sherif Abdelhamied, the Head of the Gulf Center for Iranian Studies.
Q1: You -in the Consulting Office for MENA- rank Iran as the most dangerous power to the stability and security of the MENA region. Why does Iran hold this position?
This classification is based on many variables, including Iranian direct and indirect military intervention; a state-threat poses to its neighbors; state-sponsored terrorism; level of influence or meddling in regional nations' decision-making processes; and the extent and significance of non-state actors that Iran sponsors. Of course, there is also the nuclear issue and the worsening internal situation. These essential parts all support the notion that Iran is a 'rouge state.'
Since Iran rejects the nation-state form and international institutional arrangements and seeks to bring MENA back to the nation-former state's imperial era, this classification goes beyond simply being an American description of anti-American forces.
Q2: Can you explain that?
Iran operates not only against American interests but also against the international system and agreements that took four centuries to establish, which is why I emphasize the term 'rogue state' when describing it.
The issue is that among several rivals that have been attracted to a strategic vacuum, Iran is the most dangerous. The Iranian project is grounded on historical; ideological; sectarian; and ethnonational claims, all of which serve to invoke a brief historical period that was "glorious to the Persians" ten centuries ago and an attempt to establish a new Persian empire. That has led the Iranian regime to demolish the areas where its influence has spread, that includes as much human cleansing as possible and the eviction of the area's citizens to make way for the Iranian project and Shiite elements. In other words, it takes a similar stance to the Israeli approach but on a much larger scale.
Iran cannot be separated away from the region due to its historical, human, religious, cultural, and ethnic ties to the area. That increases the Iranian regional danger by providing 'legitimacy' for extensive and multi-tooled interventions, at least for Iran.
Q3: You have referred to the concept of a 'strategic vacuum' that attracts competing powers, and you have written about it elsewhere. Why do you use the term 'vacuum'?
Firstly, we define it as the absence of a ruling authority for a specific territory (a country or a region). The dominating government of the state is one example of a local controlling authority. Other examples include one or more regional or international powers controlling a country or a region. This vacuum in MENA has been slowly emerging since 1991, liberated Kuwait and isolated Iraq; or since Somalia's civil war started. Its emergence was not immediately apparent, but it became more pronounced after 2003 when American troops invaded Iraq.
A cluster of Arab countries (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Lebanon, and to some extent Sudan) are currently going through a local/regional vacuum because of the lack of a functioning government with local and competition between political and military parties. In addition to the absence of an external controlling power.
Q4: What exactly is the function of these external controlling powers?
Afghanistan can be an example to understand the function of controlling external powers. Since the country's liberated from the Soviet Union, there has not been a central government capable of running the country; instead, it has been under American control since 2001 (i.e., a vacuum filled with American power alone, which means there is no vacuum). However, in our region, it is impossible to regulate such control because instead, it is a process of competition between regional powers (Iran, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) and international ones (the United States and its allies, Russia, while China is trying to obtain footprint). This competition has been founded inside failed or collapsed Arab states, which regrettably have been slowly expanding since 2011.
Iran is the most violent country in this competition, which is driven by militarily intervention (directly or indirectly) in Iraq; Syria; Lebanon; Yemen; and the Gaza Strip, as well as political and ideological influence in these countries or elsewhere.
Q5: What are the main factors driving Iran's regional behavior, which poses a threat to the stability in the region, and how did it come to hold such a precarious position in MENA?
Since 1994, Iran has been alongside Iraq under US control as part of the Dual Containment Strategy. However, the occupation of Iraq gave Iran a new opportunity to operate in Arab countries and to emerge what might be described as 'strategic audacity.' The Iranian government hasted to seize the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of regional security arrangements with its interests through the 'strategic initiative' and to have a portion of it before engaging in negotiations with other powers, including the United States, about regional security.
That strategy is known as a 'risk-taking' strategy because Iran chose to move forward despite knowing that regional interventions could bring about significant gains but pose serious risks. In contrast, other regional powers were still judging the effects of the shock and were waiting for new regional agreements.
However, Iran would not have implemented this strategy without several forceful tools. This strategy started with establishing coalitions or proxies in the region, most notably:
The transnational 'Shiite militias,' which have a military, political, and ideological back from Iran (authentic organic link).
Ideological 'Sunni' Islamic organizations that support 'Pan-Islamism,' which deal with Iran as a partner, including al-Qaeda; the Muslim Brotherhood; and others (a global religious link).
Pragmatic groups (regimes and local Arab elites) find in Iran a guarantor of their narrow interests (pragmatic link).
In addition, perhaps separatist groups that do not necessary collaborate with Iran on its project but find in the Iranian project a way to control some territories (a deconstructive link).
As a result, Iran has an action plan; an ideological and historical foundation that guides its project; control over its political and military tools; continuous financial and military support for its proxies; and the burden of the harm caused by regional competition (which has turned Iran into one of the world's most isolated nations with a collapsed economy). Even its American rival lacks access to all these integrated tools in MENA.
Q6: Do you believe that the United States pushed Iran to acquire this regional status, or, as is rumored, the Obama administration did that? If not, why haven't American forces launched a military strike against Iran yet?
The Obama administration has received lot of criticism. Some of that criticisim was unjustified, other wasn't. As I previously mentioned, the Iranian regional project started with Hezbollah and war with Iraq on the ground in the 1980s, and was officially launched with the invasion of Iraq under George W. Bush.
While Obama's doctrine was based on the notion that "Iran has emerged as a one of the region's key actors, and that the other regional actors (especially Saudis) must accept this and collaborate with Iran and the US to create new regional policies (Cold Peace) reflect these changes." That was rejected by the Arab countries, which were actively involved in the region (Arab Gulf States).
As a result, the American initiative led to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), which, despite its flaws, at least brought Iran's nuclear project under international control. That was before Trump withdrew from the deal and allowed Iran to resume its nuclear program.
Q7: So, why did the Trump administration not launch a military operation against Iran?
The idea that the United States abandoned its allies or refrained from militarily confronting Iran is frequently brought up in the Arab world (conspiracy theory). Yes, The United States may not have provided its Arab allies with the necessary assistance to confront Iran. But, we must understand that the United States has no interest in beginning a war in the Middle East with Iran, whose outcomes are uncertain, at a time when the international order is experiencing a highly fluid situation and a transitional period that is still taking shape.
Since the turn of the previous decade, the United States has been preoccupied with China's rise and Russia's military activities in MENA and Eastern Europe. Confronting Iran has come at a high price for the United States than those other interests. Here, we are discussing the "American" international order, not just costly regional interests.
Since Trump had a good relationship with the Gulf governments and could have taken such action as part of his "maximum pressure" campaign, the Trump administration was expected to push for limited military action in response to the Abqaiq fields' targeting in 2019. However, Trump was not prepared to deal with the fallout from that.
The biggest issue arises when the United States leaves the MENA region, diminishing its influence and involvement in regional affairs. That will inevitably lead to another vacuum that other powers (especially Iran, Turkey, and Russia) will fill at the expense of the Arab nations.
Q8: How do you judge the Arab strategy for battling Iran? Do you believe their strategy has achieved its goals, or is there something else at play that goes beyond the American let down of the Arab strategy's numerous flaws?
In the event that we concur -bypassing- with the notion of American letdown, then yes, it is far from the issue of disappointment. The decision-making process between the Persians and the Arabs is wholly different, which is the problem in this situation. There is a single leadership in Iran versus numerous Arab governments with various ideologies and interests. In addition to being aggressive and proactive, or "audacity or strategic initiative," as I called it. The Iranian approach is an 'act' approach in contrast to the Arab one, which is divided between the "react" approach and the peaceful approach that promotes stagnation in the region. The Arab approach aims to restore the previous control in the event of a defect, and in the best case scenario, it is an attempt to create a new static. That means maintaining the current conditions without change.
Therefore, the idea of regional security is the point. I am not refering to the term "Arab security', because it is no longer possible to explore and has become unrealistic. We now require a new regional security agreement.
Another dilemma with the Arab strategy is that while Iranian project is occurring in Arab territories, while Arab response has is directed at the same territories (defence approach). So it makes sense to observe that the worst destruction spreads to Arab countries. In this situation, what Iran refers to as "strategic patience" becomes apparent because it is a long-term project that could last for several decades rather than just being focused on short-term gains.
In addition, some Arab countries do not consider Iran a threat to the regional stability. Instead, they provide Iran with a variety of facilities. Other Arab countries short the definition of their national or regional security in order to exclude Arab countries influenced by Iran, which allows them to underestimate the threat posed by Iran.
In this regard, our teacher Tizini had a key contention based on the notion that "no outsider can interfere with something inside except through inside's channels," according to which Iran and others gain from the destruction in the Arab world.
Another concern is that Iran's proxies operate within a well-defined, tightly-controlled, comprehensive ideological framework, have a trustworthy relationship with Iran, and aware that Iran won't desert them. The relationship between the current Arab powers and their proxies, however—some of them have not even had proxies— is something we miss in the Arab scene.
Q9: Can you explain the concept of tools or proxies? Do you mean that the Arab countries must confront Iran internally? If so, who qualifies the Arab countries to do so?
We have always had Arab powers at the forefront of the Arab scene. We transitioned from the leadership of the Quartet of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to the one of Saudi Arabia and the UAE with a significant regional status of Egypt (which cannot be ignored). Smaller players who are more concerned with Iran than with regional security exist (I mean Qatar, of course).
Apart from the reliability consideration, Iran's tools -the pro-Iranian Arab regimes and elites- cannot be used to fight Iran, and militias like the Houthi cannot be confronted by F-16. Saudi Arabia established allies or proxies in the area and later abandoned them, leaving a secondary vacuum that Turkey hurriedly filled. Along with the fact that those proxies were not managed through a coordinated regional strategy aimed at confronting Iran and regaining control of the region, they were financed as a response to Iran's incursion, which was more akin to a financial exhaustion process in many cases. This strategy produces mercenaries rather than proxies.
Confronting Iran in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq is insufficient, while the destruction fueled by Iran is expanded in the region. The Arab side will remain the real loser if the conflict is not moved to Iran and through local proxies in Iran.
Due to the low cost of Iranian military action (Shiite elements, ideology, light weapons, permanent support), Iran has so far had massive economic damage with few military casualties (that has been affoardable). But those costs have come with significant benefits (running countries, displacing millions of people, killing hundreds of thousands of Arabs, if not millions, destroying infrastructure, and disrupting the foreseeable and medium future of the targeted countries).
Q10: So, according to you, the conduct of sectarian proselytizing has a military aspect and is more than just a religious issue?
The mullahs' regime undoubtedly has not and will not differ from any other Persian regime in its animosity toward Arabs and its projects directed at them.
Iran's regime realizes it is too costy to confront the nations of the region directly, especially after the experience of the eight-year war with Iraq and the outcome of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iran, therefore, primarily uses covert military intervention (through proxies).
Those proxies come in a variety of forms. As I previously mentioned, the Shiites are either: essential to the project (Hezbollah, for example); or simply Shiite mercenaries (the components of the dispersed militias). Among them are new Shiites who have been launched after being incorporated into the Iranian military machine for the money, ideology, or other reasons.
As a result, we notice Iranian proselytizing activity from far east Asia to sub-Saharan Africa to search of fighters under the banner "Support the Ahl al-Bayt" in order to turn them into military commodities by offering them lucrative salaries, military positions, sexual services, and even settlement in some targeted environments (as it is in Syria). In addition to the divine promise of paradise. Long-range missiles, Patriots, and F-16s cannot defeat them.
Q11: Let us turn to the topic of Iran's nuclear program. Do you think Iran will have nuclear weapons, or is it just a political maneuver? What if it does have access to this weapon? What does the region's future hold in light of Iran's nuclear capability?
Trump's campaign of "maximum pressure" caused both parties to break their international commitments, which helped Iran advance to a "nuclear threshold state" with an enrichment level over 60%, which is very close to the level needed to obtain nuclear weapon technology. Iran could, if it wanted to, reach a level above 90% in 3 weeks, according to estimates. That is a technical issue, but in terms of arming technology, it is more complicated.
Despite all its maneuvers, Iran -in my opinion- is presently focused on two things: accepting its status as a nuclear threshold state and not going beyond it to achieve international openness and the removal of sanctions. In other words, the nuclear option is a pressure tactic at that point. However, if that tactic failed, Iran would have gained the scientific know-how necessary to develop nuclear weapons in the short term. I think Iran won't give up this technology, especially after the lessons learned from Libya, Iraq, and Ukraine.
If it does have such weapons, it will increase Iran's power and influence on the regional and global levels and support its regional project.
Q12: Iran has significant regional and international relations. What role do those relations play in the current situation in the region, and do you think these relations can constrain Iranian destructive behavior in MENA?
In this meaning, Iran has two different kinds of relations. The first is a close arrangement with Russia and Turkey, which are competing with one another to fill the vacuum in MENA. It controls this competition through alternating presidential summits to keep from colliding. There may be some armed conflicts between their proxies on the ground, but this does not necessarily mean trouble between these powers. Instead, they are eager to seize control of the MENA vacuum and keep the US and the Arabs out of that vacuum.
The second type is the relations based on shared interests, especially those with China. I do not think China or any other country is particularly interested in restricting Iranian behavior, particularly at this time of international fluidity. Every great power is seeking allies now (without being compelled to pose constraints on them), which is essentially a Chinese feature.
The issue here is that some Arab powers think that improving relations with Iran's network of allies will lead those powers to put pressure on Iran, restrict its project, or even abandon it. I do not believe that is possible.
Instead of asking the international powers to confront Iran in favor of Arab (international relations do not operate in this manner), the Arab should instead embark on a solid project on the ground and secure international support.
Another issue is that a confrontation with Iran will result from the alliance with Israel. Despite all of the statements, Israel alone lacks the capability, desire, and interest of the United States to directly engage in military conflict with Iran or any other country without open American support.
Israel is attempting to drag the United States into an open conflict with Iran because its actions are limited to sabotage, piracy, assassination, and confrontation with Iran in Arab countries (as is often the case in Syria). There is no place in current US strategies for a new Middle Eastern collapse that is significantly worse than what is happening now.
Q13: The Iranian issue and its effects on the region are topics of much discussion. In light of the recent unrest, how do you envision the future of Iran's interior? Do you think that the Iranian regime will be overthrown in the foreseable future, and in which way?
Although it is poised to fall, the current Iranian regime (the mullahs) has continued in this manner for years despite no longer being qualified to rule the Iranian state and its legitimacy being rapidly eroded. As a Middle Eastern observer, I fear the sudden demise of a country the size and power of Iran on the one hand. In addition to my lack of confidence in any succeeding Iranian regime, the concern I see is a problem with the Persian creed itself, and up until this point, the rivals of the mullahs' regime have not illustrated any significant signs of giving up the imperial strategy in the Arab world or overcoming the historical period in which the Persians got stuck 15 centuries ago.
In the event of a change, which is probably on the way, I think the military forces will continue to function even if their allegiances shift. That means that the Revolutionary Guards will continue down the path of change and won't let the state be collapsed, unless new changes appear.
Although the PMOI's fortunes are better than those of other Iranian opposition groups, I do not believe they will be cut off from the Revolutionary Guards. In fact, there is no opposition inside or outside of Iran that is able to challenge the Revolutionary Guards. I warry about is the rise to power in Tehran of an opposition group that is acceptable to the West; has an ethno-Persian intolerance; supports the Iranian project in the Middle East; has access to nuclear technology; and uses a variety of proxies. Then, we must get ready for a new wave of Iranian expansion in the Arab world, a wave that does not threaten Western and Israeli interests.
The original interview was published in Arabic in: Iranian Affairs, Issue 19, in January 2023.
Source: The Consulting Office for MENA
By: Dr. ABD ALQADER NANAA
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