The Iranian nuclear project is regarded as one of the most complicated in the Middle East. For many decades, the international community -led by the United States- has been unable to limit Iran's pursuit of nuclear military technology despite the principle of dual containment that the Clinton administration adopted towards Iraq and Iran in the 1990s, at a time when the United States (and its ally Israel) was on guard to eliminate any preliminary structures for nuclear projects in Iraq, Syria, and Libya during the same period, leading many to question the American commitment.
The American approach to the Iranian nuclear issue
The American approach has relied on a long series of sanctions that have exhausted the Iranian regime and people since 1979, with the occasional military threat (the big stick), without being accompanied by actual military action towards the nuclear project or a response to interference by Iranian agents in the Middle East or even in defense of US allies when they were subjected to Iranian military aggression (whether direct or indirect).
The actual breakthrough in this approach occurred during the Obama administration via a third path represented by the diplomatic way, which led the two parties (and, behind them, the P5+1 group and the international community) to the nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA. This agreement represented a significant breakthrough in one of the most difficult Middle Eastern issues, putting Iran's nuclear development under international scrutiny on the one hand and allowing Iran to gradually re-engage in the international environment, particularly in international trade and economic fields. It was a significant achievement for Iran because it would allow it to legitimize its nuclear efforts in the international arena after a few years of monitoring.
This agreement, however, was not accompanied by broader Middle Eastern settlements concerning Iran's ballistic missile program, military interventions in the region, and the ongoing threat to Arab countries. Perhaps Obama's initial idea was based on "sharing interests in the Middle East between Iran and Saudi Arabia," along with other regional powers. However, the two parties (Iran and Saudi Arabia) rejected Obama's offer because they believed they could defeat each other in regional competition.
The most significant difference between Iran and the major Arab powers emerges here: Iran has a long-term project based on a historical-sectarian-nationalist tendency, aiming to extend influence and reshape identity, demographics, and even geography throughout the Arab Levant, and if possible, beyond That (the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa). Iran has accomplished this project in two decades (2003-2023), as its influence has spread beyond Baghdad and Beirut to Damascus and Sanaa, all while preparing for what comes next. While the Arab projects were immediate, incomplete reactions, they lacked the identity dimension that the Iranian project possessed.
Some Arab observers, on the other hand, believe that Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and imposition of "maximum pressure" is a far superior strategy to Obama's diplomatic approach. However, Trump did not take any steps to protect his Middle Eastern allies and partners (especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which were targeted by an Iranian military attack in 2019), nor did he take any steps to limit Iran's influence in many Arab countries. Trump's withdrawal also allowed Iran to gradually evade its international obligations regarding its nuclear program, allowing it to resume developing it both secretly and openly, civilly and militarily.
Biden's strategy for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue
Despite Biden's efforts to restore Obama's diplomatic approach, the Biden administration was unable to control the development of the Iranian project. Biden's Iran policy was weak, ineffective, and lacked the coercive tools his predecessors possessed.
An important cause of the failure to control Iran's nuclear project can be attributed to the Biden administration, another element to the two parties' loss of trust following Trump's withdrawal, and a third issue to significant international changes. All of these factors contributed to Iran's transition from a nuclear program under international supervision (during Obama's presidency) to a nuclear threshold state (during Biden's presidency) after it demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium at rates exceeding 60% or even 80%. It is reportedly a few weeks away from producing the first Iranian nuclear bomb, which is subject to technical measures on the one hand and Iranian sovereign will on the other, and the international reasons today have nothing but delaying efforts. And nothing else to get in the way of this moment.
Subsequently, the Biden administration's failure on this issue was evident in the previous years, and he also lost the option of military action (which may have been in 2019 when Iran targeted Saudi Arabia and the UAE during Trump's presidency). There was a legitimate justification at the time, and regional powers were united in confronting Iran, as well as a supportive international environment. The international situation has completely changed: the countries of the region are no longer willing to engage in a military operation that could last for years and deplete their future development plans, savings, economic growth, and current stability, and it is possible that only Israel is pushing for this option.
The International Variables Problem
Returning to the international circumstance that bears a part of this failure, the international environment has not been the same since 2022, and it has become clear the flexibility of the "unilateral" international system, the signs of which began to appear clear since Trump came to power, but it has become A reality imposed on international politics after 2022. With Russia's defiance of the international order and China's rise to polar competition, the United States is no longer able or willing to take military action in the Middle East as it was in previous decades.
This approach strengthens Russia's and China's relations with the region's countries, as well as the emergence of a flexible polarization approach for the MENA region and the countries of what was known as the Third World (or the World South). As a result, today's international environment crystallizes alternatives to American coercion, which has been a defining feature for decades and has become a type of American imperative since the Cold War. In addition, this international flexibility/liquidity is bolstered by Sub-Saharan countries' efforts to break free from Western (French) custody (in collaboration with Russia and China).
This international environment, which will produce a new and different international order in the coming years/decades (in which the US will continue to play an important role), is no longer conducive to unilateral American military measures and will not legitimize an American war, despite the Biden administration's continued waving of a stick that is no longer as thick as usual. Meanwhile, the United States' priorities have been shifted to Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and other less vital regions. Iran is fully aware of these international changes and, like many other countries in the MENA region, is attempting to find a place that suits its interests.
These variables have made reaching a nuclear agreement more problematic, and it has become clear that the two parties (American and Iranian) are far from reaching an agreement that will return Iran to its status as a "pre-threshold nuclear state," and the matter may have become unworkable. However, the two parties urgently require negotiating successes (temporary gains) that help Biden's election campaign and calm the Iranian regime's crises. The prisoner swap deal can be viewed as an alternative to the anticipated nuclear deal because it provides both parties with a "temporary gain" and ensures that indirect negotiations between them continue in the future. It is a new American approach linked to the previously mentioned international variables.
It is hard to predict the course of relations between the two parties after the negotiating blockage, and impractical to build on this exchange deal. Biden's election success will not, as it appears, lead to a new negotiating approach, whereas the success of a hard-line Republican opponent may return the scene to something similar to what it was during the Trump administration, particularly in the years 2019-2020. That led Iran to be more obstinate in negotiations and to develop military capabilities.
The role of regional variables
The leading regional powers in the Middle East have recognized the nature of these developments and the reduction in American commitment to the region, so they quickly modified their methods in what became known as the Omni-Aligned approach. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt expanded their relations with Russia and China on the one hand and rearranged their regional rivalries through a series of trans-regional reconciliations with Qatar and Turkey, then Israel, and more recently with Iran, in what appears to be a broad process of cooling the Middle East's intractable crises. In this multi-crisis situation, all parties are unable to find solutions, particularly in the collapsed/failed/fragile states (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan).
Arab reconciliation with Iran may be the most exceptional event along this path, especially given that Iran has been the most dangerous adversary to the Arab region over the last decade while Iran's military intervention -via its agents- in the Arab world is still ongoing, and the Iranian nuclear and ballistic threat remains a constant in Middle Eastern power calculations.
To summarize, given the failure of successive American administrations to rein in Iranian aggressive behavior to push Iran down into a persuasive and creative diplomatic path, the chances of Arab countries -and China behind them- controlling Iranian behavior are far less than those of the United States. It implies preparing for a new wave of Iranian intervention, targeting new Arab environments with old and new tools. We must not rely on Iran's current situation because the international community has become more willing to accept a nuclear Iran.
Dr. ABD ALQADER NANAA
The Chief Consultant